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Technical uncertainty as a Correlate of Information Use by U.S.
Industry-Affiliated Aerospace Engineers and Scientists
by
Thomas E. Pinelli, Nanci A. Glassman, Linda O. Affelder,
Laura M. Hecht, John M. Kennedy, and Rebecca O. Barclay
ABSTRACT
This paper reports the results of an exploratory study
that investigated the influence of technical uncertainty on
the use of information and information sources by U.S.
industry-affiliated aerospace engineers and scientists in com-
pleting or solving a project, task, or problem. Data were
collected through a self-administered questionnaire. Sur-
vey participants were U.S. aerospace engineers and scientists
whose names appeared on the Society of Automotive Engi-
neers (SAE) mailing list. The results support the findings
of previous research and the following study assumptions.
Information and information-source use differ for projects,
problems, and tasks with high and low technical uncertainty.
As technical uncertainty increases, information-source use
changes from internal to external and from informal to for-
mal sources. As technical uncertainty increases, so too does
the use of federally funded aerospace research and develop-
ment (RA_D). The use of formal information sources to learn
about federally funded aerospace R&D differs for projects,
problems, and tasks with high and low technical uncertainty.
INTRODUCTION
The NASA/DoD Aerospace Knowledge Diffusion Research
Project attempts to understand, among other things, the
information environment in which U.S. aerospace engineers
and scientists work and the factors that influence their use of
scientific and technical information (STI) (PineUi, Kennedy,
and Barclay, 1991). Such an understanding could (1) lead
to the development of practical theory, (2) contribute to the
design and development of aerospace information systems,
and (3) have practical implications for transferring the re-
suits of federally funded aerospace research and development
(R&D) to the U.S. aerospace community.
This paper reports the results of an exploratory study
that investigated the influence of technical uncertainty on
the use of information and information sources by U.S.
industry-affiliated aerospace engineers and scientists in com-
pleting or solving a project, task, or problem. Several au-
thors have explored relationships among uncertainty and
information use (Gifford, Bobbitt, and Slocum, 1979; and
Randolph, 1978). Randolph (1978) found that the greater
the uncertainty associated with the task, the greater the
use of STI. These findings, plus the work of Bodensteiner
(1970); Holland, Stead and Leibrock (1976); Atkin (1973);
and Kuhlthau (1991), led us to investigate the extent to
which the perceived technical uncertainty of a project, task,
or problem affected the use of information and information
sources by U.S. aerospace engineers and scientists. The work
of Paisley (1980), Wilson (1981), Roberts (1982), Dervin
(1983), and Taylor (1991) regarding "information use envi-
ronments" influenced the conceptual framework, underling
assumptions, and direction of this study.
Information on the aerospace information environment
is included to help establish a context for the study. The
study's methodology is described, and the variables and their
measurement are explained. The study's hypotheses, the
data used to test the hypotheses, and a discussion of thc
results are presented.
THE AEROSPACE INFORMATION
ENVIRONMENT
Organizations such as aerospace that arc involved in in-
novation are open systems that must deal with complexity
and sources of work-related uncertainty (Katz and Kahn.
1966). This proposition traces its origins to, among oth-
ers, Galbraith (1973) and Duncan (1973), who havc con-
ceptualized organizations as information processing systems
that must deal with uncertainty. Tyson (1992) and Mowery
(1985) state that the aerospace industry, in particular thc
commercial aviation sector, is characterized by the high de-
gree of systemic complexity embodied in the design and de-
velopment of its products. Industries such as aerospace must
deal with technical and market uncertainty from outside
the organization as well as uncertainty concerning problem
solving within the organization (Myers and Marquis, 1969:
Utterback, 1974). Miller (1971) states that organizations use
business and technical information, obtained largely from
the external environment, to reduce technical uncertainty
and complexity.
Three factors (task characteristics, task environment, and
task interdependence) combine to influence the degree of
technical uncertainty and complexity with which organiza-
tions involved in innovation must contend (Tushman and
Nadler, 1980). Uncertainty increases as the task becomes
more complicated, as the environment becomes more dy-
namic, and as task interdependence becomes more com-
plex. The greater the technical uncertain t'y and complexity.
the greater the information processing requirements and the
greater the need for information external to the organization
(Rosenbloom and Wolek, 1970; Allen, 1970).
In a telephone survey (Pinelli, Kennedy, and White,
1992), members of the Society of Automotive Engineers
(SAE) were asked how the technical uncertainty of a project
affected the need for STI. Most aerospace engineers (71 per-
cent) agreed that technical uncertainty increased the need
for STI. About 58 percent strongly agreed that technical
uncertainty increased the need for internal STI. and 42 per-
cent strongly agreed that it increased the need for external
STI. Non-aerospace engineers (66 percent) also agreed that
technical uncertainty increased the need for STI. About 40
pcrcent strongly agreed that technical uncertainty incrca,sed
the need for internal STI, and about 36 percent strongly
agreed that technical uncertainty increased the need for cx-
ternal STI.
However,it is thenature of organizations that are 'in-
volved in innovation, such as aerospace, to isolate themselves
from their external environment and to erect barriers to
communication with the external environment (Gerstenfeld
and Berger, 1980). This behavior is due, in large part, to
the need for organizations to maintain stability and control,
and because these organizations are involved in activities of a
proprietary nature that involve trade secrets and intellectual
property (Fischer, 1980; Allen, 1970). Aerospace organiza-
tions are frequently involved in work that may be classified
for reasons of national security. As Fischer (1980) points out,
however, there is a danger for organizations engaged in inno-
vation to become isolated from their external environment
and from information external to the organization. Organi-
zations use a variety of techniques or "boundary-spanning"
activities to maintain contact with the external environment
and to acquire business and technical information that is
external to the organization. The three primary boundary-
spanning activities used by organizations involved in innova-
tion fall into two groups--the informal that relies on colle-
gial/peer group contacts and gatekeepers/linking agents and
the formal that relies on librarians and technical informa-
tion specialists. The more "active" and coordinated these
activities, the more effective the boundary-spanning func-
tion. The work of Aguilar (1967), Duncan (1972), Keegan
(1974), Hambrick (1979), and Auster and Choo (1993) is
relevant to this discussion.
Derian (1990) has described the U.S. aerospace indus-
try as a "sheltered" (as opposed to an exposed) culture be-
cause of the role played by government in the innovation
process and because aerospace operates in both government
and private sector markets. He points out that, unlike other
U.S. industries, aerospace, principally the commercial avi-
ation sector, has been the beneficiary of federally funded
P_D for nearly a century. According to Mowery (1985),
"The commercial aircraft industry is virtually unique among
U.S. manufacturing industries in that a Federal research
organization, the National Advisory Committee for Aero-
nauties (NACA) and subsequently the National Aeronau-
tics and Space Administration (NASA), has for many years
conducted and funded research on airframe and propulsion
technologies." The commercial aviation sector has also ben-
efitted from considerable investment, in terms of research
and procurement, by the Department of Defense (DoD).
"Although not intended to support innovation in any but
military airframe and propulsion technologies, [this invest-
ment] has, nonetheless, yielded indirect, but very important,
technological spiUovers to the commercial aircraft industry"
(Mowery, 1985).
Derian (1990) states that the aerospace industry is sub-
ject to a unique set of externalities that result from gov-
ernment intervention which, in turn, change the structure
and regulation of the marketplace. Thus, the external envi-
ronments of sheltered and exposed cultures are distinctive,
as is the interaction between the two cultures and the ex-
ternal environment. In the case of the U.S. aerospace in-
dustry, the interaction with and isolation from the exter-
nal environment are moderated somewhat by the "supply-
push/demand-pull" effect created by the U.S. government's
involvement, primarily through NASA and the DoD, in the
aerospace innovation process. From a policy perspective, the
U.S. government is both a performer and a dominant pur-
chaser of aerospace R&D, supports precommercial research
in civilian and military aircraft technologies, and plays ,_
major role in diffusing the results of that research through-
out the aerospace industry.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The conceptual framework is based on the work of Paislcy
(1968, 1980), Allen (1977), Taylor (1991), and Mick (1979)
and represents an extension of Orr's (1970) scheme of thf'
engineer-scientist as an information processor. Infornmtion
use is central to this concept. It acts to moderate (reduce)
uncertainty. Rogers (1982) has stated that the process of
innovation involves considerable risk and grappling with
unknowns which may be technical, economic, or merely the
manifestation of personal and social variables. When faced
with technical uncertainty, individuals seek information.
which is why information (communication) behavior cannot
be ignored in the study of technological innovation.
Three consistent findings emerge from the numerous in-
formation use studies that have been conducted over the
past 25 years: the reliance of engineers on interpersonal com-
munication (e.g., face-to-face conversations), the proclivity
of engineers to use information that is closest in proximity
(e.g., personal collection of infornmtion) to their work site.
and the tendency of enginccrs not to rely on libraries and the
assistance of librarians for obtaining information. Engineers
do use written communications. Their use of information
is not always limited to their personal collections, however.
They do use libraries and seek the assistance of librarians.
They tend to use all of these sources presumably until thciT
need for information has been met.
Assumptions
This study is guided by the assumption that informa-
tion use and patterns of information use by U.S. aerospace
engineers and scientists differ with the degree of technical
uncertainty (high or low) characteristic of the project, prob-
lem, or task at hand. The basic assumptions are: (1) as
technical uncertainty increases, the time spent communicat-
ing technical information increases; and (2) as technical un-
certainty increases, reliance on information from internal.
informal sources gives way to the use of information from
external, formal sources. Specifically, it is expected that
U.S. aerospace engineers and scientists working on projects,
problems, and tasks with high technical uncertainty will
make greater use of external sources of information. Exter-
nal sources include (1) colleagues outside of the organization
and (2) published sources of written information that orig-
inate outside of the organization (e.g., conference/meeting
papers, journal articles, and technical reports). Further.
U.S. aerospace engineers and scientists working on projects,
problems, and tasks with high technical uncertainty will
make greater use of the formal information process. The
formal component of the information structure is defined as
(1) the use of the organization's library or technical informa-
tion center and (2) the use of the organization's librarians
and technical information specialists.
This study also assumes that the results of federally
funded aerospace R&D are used by U.S. aerospace engineers
and scientists in industry to moderate (reduce) technical un-
certainty. Federally funded R&D is defined here as informa-
tion available in NASA or DoD reports. It is expected that
2.
U.S. aerospace engineers and scientists will be more likely to
use federally funded R&D reports when working on projects,
problems, and tasks that are high in technical uncertainty
than on projects characterized by low levels of uncertainty.
Finally, it is expected that the use of formal information
sources by U.S. aerospace engineers and scientists as a means
to learn about federally funded aerospace R&D increases as
the technical uncertainty of the project, problem, or task
increases.
Hypotheses
This study seeks to understand the influence of technical
uncertainty on (1) information production and information
use, (2) the use of external information, (3) the use of formal
information sources, and (4) the use of federally funded
aerospace R&D. The following hypotheses, informed by the
assumptions reviewed above, were generated for testing:
Technical Uncertainty and Information Production/Use
H1 As the technical uncertainty of job-related projects,
tasks, or problems increases, the number of hours
per week spent communicating technical informa-
tion in writing increases.
H 2 As the technical uncertainty ofjob-related projects,
tasks, or problems increases, tSe number of hours
per week spent communicating technical informa-
tion to others orally increases.
H3 As the technical uncertainty of job-related projects,
tanks, or problems increases, the number of hours
per week spent working with written technical in-
formation received from others increases.
H4 As the technical uncertainty of job-related projects,
tasks, or problems increases, the number of hours
per week spent working with technical informa-
tion received orally from others increases.
Technical Uncertainty and External Information Use
H 5 As the technical uncertainty of job-related projects,
tasks, or problems increases, the frequency of use
of written technical information (journal articles)
produced outside of the organization increases.
I-I6 As the technical uncertainty of job-related projects,
tanks, or problems increases, the frequency of
use of written technical information (conference/
meeting papers) produced outside of the organi-
zation increases.
H7 As the technical uncertainty of job-related projects,
tasks, or problems increases, the frequency of use
of written technical information (U.S. government
technical reports) produced outside of the organi-
zation increases.
H 8 The technical uncertainty of job-related projects,
tasks, or problems is related to the frequency of
use of written technical information obtained from
colleagues outside of the organization.
Technical Uncertainty and the Use of Formal
Information Sources
H 9 The level of technical uncertainty of job-related
projects, tanks, or problems is related to the use
(non-nse) of technical information obtained from
the organization's library.
HlO The level of technical uncertainty of job-related
projects, tasks, or problems is related to the use
.(non-use) of technical information obtained from
librarians and technical information specialists
inside of the organization.
Technical Uncertainty and the Use of Federally
Funded Aerospace R&D
Hll The level of technical uncertainty of job-related
projects, tasks, or problems is related to the use
of federally funded aerospace R&D.
H12 The level of technical uncertainty of job-related
projects, tasks, or problems is related to the re-
ported importance of federally funded aerospace
R&D.
H13 The level of technical uncertainty of job-related
projects, tasks, or problems is related to the use
of federally funded "R&D found in NASA or DoD
technical reports.
H14 The level of technical uncertainty of job-related
projects, tasks, orproblems is related to the use
of colleagues outside of the organization to learn
about fe_teralI_--n-d-ed aerospace R_D.
H15 The level of technical uncertainty of job-related
projects, tasks, or problems is related to the use
of librarians inside of the organization to learn
about federallTl_ded aerospace R&D.
H16 The level of technical uncertainty of job-related
projects, tasks, or problenus is reIated to the use
of searches of computerized data bases to learn
about federally funded aerospace I_D.
H17 The level of technical uncertainty of job-related
projects, tasks, or problems is related to the use
of publications such ms STAll to learn about fed-
erally funded aerospace_
METHODOLOGY
This research was conducted as a Phase 1 activity of the
NASA/DoD Aerospace Knowledge Diffusion Research Project.
The study utilized survey research in the form of a self-
administered (self-reported) mail questionnaire. Survey par-
ticipants were U.S. aerospace engineers and scientists whose
names appeared on the Society of Automotive Engineers
(SAE) mailing list. A total of 946 usable surveys was re-
ceived by the established cut-off date. Of the 946 respon-
dents, 872 (92.2%) worked in industry, 63 (6.7%) worked in
government, 6 (0.6%) worked in academia, and 5 (0.5%) had
some other affiliation. The adjusted completion rate for the
survey was 67 percent.
A variation of Flanagan's (1954) critical incident tech-
nique was used to guide data collection. According to
Lancaster (1978), the theory behind the critical incident
technique is that it is much easier for people to recall ac-
curately what they did on a specific occurrence or occasion
than it is to remember what they do in general. In this
study, respondents were asked to categorize the most impor-
tant job-related project, task, or problem they had worked
on in the past 6 months. The categories included (1) educa-
tion, (2) research, (3) desigu/development, (4) manufactur-
ing/production, (5) computer applications, (6) management,
and (7) other.
Respondents were also asked to rate the amount of
technical uncertainty they faced when they started their
most important project, task, or problem. Technical un-
certainty was measured on 5-point scales (1.0 = little uncer-
tainty; 5.0 = great uncertainty). Survey participants were
also asked to indicate whether they worked alone or with
others in completing/solving the most important job-related
project, task, or problem they had worked on in the past six
months.
Technicaluncertainty and the importance of federally
funded aerospace R&D were measured using ordinal scales.
Hours spent communicating and the number of journal arti-
cles, conference/meeting papers, and U.S. government tech-
nical reports used were measured on an interval scale. Use
of formal information sources and federally funded aerospace
R&D were measured using a nominal scale. Hypothesis tests
were based on responses of the 872 industry-affiiated respon-
dents (total number of respondents = 946). A one-tailed
t-test was used to test hypotheses involving the mean num-
ber of hours and information products used; Pearson's r was
used to test correlations. The chi-square test of indepen-
dence was used to test hypotheses involving nominal data.
DESCRIPTIVE FINDINGS
The following "composite" participant profile was devel-
oped for the industry-affiliated respondents: has a bachelor's
degree (52.5%), has an average of 18.7 years of work experi-
ence in aerospace, was educated as and works as an engineer
(90.7%, 90.8%), and works in design/development (60.4%).
Survey participants were asked to categorize the most
important job-related project, task, or problem they had
worked on in the past six months. A majority of the job-
related projects, tasks, and problems (56.4%) were catego-
rized as design/development. About 11 percent and 14 per-
cent of the job-related projects, tasks, and problems were
categorized as manufacturing/production and management,
respectively. Most respondents (82.7%) worked with others
(did not work alone) in completing their most important job-
related project, task, or problem. On average, respondents
worked with 2.75 groups; each group contained an average of
6.7 members. A majority of respondents (72%) performed
engineering duties while working on their most important
job-related project, task, or problem. About 24 percent per-
formed management duties.
TESTS OF THE HYPOTHESES
Technical Uncertainty and Information Production/Use
Hypotheses H1 through H4 state that as the technical
uncertainty of job-related projects, tasks, or problems in-
creases, the number of hours per week spent in the past
six months communicating information increases. Techni-
cal uncertainty was initially measured using a 5-point scale
(1 = little uncertainty; 5 = great uncertainty). Job-related
projects, tasks, or problems were sorted into two categories
for hypothesis testing: "low uncertainty" (technical uncer-
tainty = 1, 2) and "high uncertainty" (technical uncertainty
= 3, 4, 5). The mean number of hours per week spent
(1) communicating technical information to others, both
written and orally, and (2) working with information, both
written and oral, received from others was calculated for each
uncertainty group. T-tests were used to determine whether
a significant relationship exits between the amount of time
spent communicating technical information and the level of
technical uncertainty associated with the project, task, or
problem in question. Results of these tests follow:
Communicating Technical Information: Significlnt
T.oo Others: Uncertainly Difference of
(Oulp=t) _ _) (n) _?
In Writing: low 8.35 217 Y_*
High 9.11 618
Orally: Low 10.26 220 No
High 10.85 613
Working With Technical In[onnation: Significant
Received From Others: Uncertainty Difference tlf
(Input) Gn_up (X) (n) Groun Mcans_
In Writing: Low 6.66 223 Yes*
High 8.18 635
Orally: Low 6.17 213 Ye.g*
nigh 7.42 606
*p • 0.05.
The differences between the group means for communi-
cating written information to others and working with tech-
nical information received from others (both written infor-
mation and communicating orally) are statistically signifi-
cant. These results provide support for hypotheses HI, H3,
and H4: as the technical uncertainty of job-related projects,
tasks, or problems increases, the number of hours per week
spent communicating technical information to others and
working with technical information received from others,
both written and oral, increases. The difference between
the group means for communicating technical information to
others orally is not statistically significant. Thus H2, which
states that the number of hours per week spent working with
information received orally from others increases as the un-
certainty of the project, task, or problem increases, was not
supported.
Technical Uncertainty Rating and Information Use--
Products Used
Hypotheses H5 through H7 state that as the techni-
cal uncertainty of job-related projects, tasks, or problems
increases, the mean number of externally produced informa-
tion products used increases. Again, technical uncertainty
scores were sorted into the categories "low uncertainty" and
"high uncertainty." Means were calculated for these two
groups with regard to the number of journal articles, con-
ference/meeting papers, and U.S. government technical re-
ports (NASA and DoD reports) used in the past six months.
Hypotheses H5 through H7 were tested by calculating (1)
correlations between the number of externally produced in-
formation products used in the past 6 months (Pearson's r)
with technical uncertainty and (2) performing t-tests to de-
termine whether a significant relationship exists between the
number of externally produced products used and the level
of technical uncertainty of the project, task or problem. Re-
sults of these tests follow:
Li
Technical Uncertainly Rating and Information Products Used:
r
Journal P.alicl_ ,1097'*
Conference/Meeting Papers .0688
U.S Government Technical ReporL_ (1862"
* p I; O.Ol.
** p s 0.001.
Significant
Uncertainty Difference of
_) (.) _?
Journal _ 4.81 Z_I Ye.s*
Article.*'* High 7,46 641
Conference/Meeting
Papers" Law 2.70 231 Yes*
High 4.10 641
U,S Government
Technical Reports'* Low 2.70 231 Yes*
High 4.10 641
"p tt 0.05.
** Item non-responses coded as O.
Technical Uncertainty and the Use of Formal
Information Sources
Hypotheses H9 and H10 state that the technical uncer-
tainty of job-related projects, tasks, and problems i._ re-
lated to (1) the use of information obtained from a libral-
ian/technical information specialist inside the organization
and (2) the use of information obtained from the organiza-
tion's library. The technical uncertainty associated with the
most important job-related project, task, or problem is cat-
egorized as low uncertainty or high uncertainty. The level
of uncertainty is then cross-tabulated with (1) the use/non-
use of a librarian/technical information specialist inside the
organization and (2) the use/non-use of technical informa-
tion obtained from the organization's library. The chi-squaro
statistic is used to test for a significant relationship.
Use of a Librarian/I'echnical Information Specialist
Inside the Organization
The t-tests indicate that the differences in the mean
number of externally produced information products used by
the two uncertainty groups (low and high) are statistically
significant. These results support the hypotheses which
collectively state that as technical uncertainty increases, the
frequency of use of externally produced information products
increases.
Technical Uncertainty and External Information Use--
Colleagues Outside of the Organization
Hypothesis H 8 states that the use/non-use of techni-
cal information obtained from colleagues outside of the
organization is related to the level (high or low) of technical
uncertainty of job-related projects, tasks, or problems. This
hypothesis was tested by cross-tabulating low and high tech-
nical uncertainty with the use/non-use of colleagues outside
of the organization. The chi-square analysis follows. The
chi-square test of independence revealed that information
obtained from colleagues outside of the organization is re-
lated to the technical uncertainty of the job-related project,
task, or problem. The chi-square statistic is significant at
p < 0.05. Hypothesis H 8 (technical uncertainty is related
to the use of colleagues outside of the organization) is sup-
ported.
Use of Colleagues Outside of the Organization
Don't Use
Count
Row Pct
Col Pet
Residual
152
62.6%
23.7%
-26.6
489 629
77.7% 72.19
76.3%
26.6
Use I
Technical Uncertainty z
Low High
Row
Total
0 91 243
37.4% 27.9%
39.4%
26.6
140
22.3%
60.6%
-26.6
Column 231 641
Total 26.5% 73.59
Value DF
Pearson Ch l-Square 20.77192 1
* p s 0.05.
** Item non-responses coded as 0.
872**
100.0%
Significance
.00001"
Count
Row Pct
Col Pct
Residual
Don't Use 0
Use 1
Column
Total
Technical Uncertaintyt
Low High
Pearson Chl-Square
* p • 0.05.
Row
Total
150 356 506
29.69 70.4% 58.0%
64.9% 55.5%
16.0 -16.0
81 285 366
22.19 77.9% 42.0%
35.19 44.5%
-16.0 16.0
231 641 872**
26.5% 73.5% 100.09
Value DF Significance
.........................
6.15629 1 .01309"
** Item non-responses coded as 0.
Use of Information Obtained From the Organization's
Library
Count
Row Pct
Col Pct
Residual
Don't Use
Use
Technical Oncertaintyt
Low Hlgh
Row
Total
0 117 206 323
36.2% 63.8% 37.0_
50.6% 32.19
31.4 -31.4
1 114 435 549
20.8% 79.2% 63.0%
49.4% 67.9%
-31.4 31.4
Column 231 641 872**
Total 26.5% 73.5% I00.0%
Value DF Significance
.........................
Pearson Chi-Square 24.95292 1 .00000"
*ps 0.05
** Item non-responses coded as 0.
The chi-square test of independence revealed that a re-
lationship exists between (l) the use of a librarian/technical
information specialist inside the organization and the level
(low or high) of technical uncertainty or a project, task or
problem and (2) the use of technical information obtained
from the organization's library, and the level (low or high)
of technical uncertainty of a project, task, or problem. Hy-
potheses H9 and HlO are therefore supported.
Technical Uncertainty and the Use of Federally Funded .
Aerospace R&D
Hypotheses Hll through H17 state that the technical un-
certainty of job-related projects, tasks, or problems is related
to the use of federally funded aerospace R&D. Specifically.
the seven hypotheses state that job-related projects, tasks,
or problems characterized by high technical uncertainty are
related to (1) the use of federally funded R_D, (2) the use
of federally funded aerospace R&D found in NASA or DoD
technical reports, (3) the reported importance of federally
funded aerospace R&D, (4) the use of colleagues outside of
the organization to find out about the results of federally
funded aerospace R&D, (5) the use of librarians/technical
information specialists inside the organization to find out
about the results of federally funded aerospace R&D, (6)
the use of computerized data bases to find out about the
results of federally funded aerospace R&D, and (7) the use
of publications such as STAR to find out about the results
of federally funded aerospace R&D. The results of the chi-
square analyses follow:
Use of Federally Funded Aerospace R&D
Technical Uncertainty s
Low Slgh
Count
Row Pct
Col Pct
Residual
Don't Use .00
Ose 1.00
Column
Total
ROW
Total
206 448 654
31.59 68.5% 75.0%
89.2% 69.9%
32.8 -32.8
25 193 218
11.59 88.5% 25.0%
10.89 30.19
-32.8 32.8
231 641 872**
26.5% 73.5% 100.09
Value DF
Pearson Chi-Square 33.68742 1
* p s 0.05
** Item non-responses coded as 0.
Significance
.00000"
Use of Federally Funded Aerospace R&D found
in NASA or DoD Technical Reports
Count
Row Pot
Col Pct
Residual
Don't Uaa .00
Use 1.00
ColUmn
Total
Technical Uncertaintyz
Low High
Row
Total
213 521 734
29.0% 71.09 84.2%
92.2% 81.39
18.6 -18.6
18 120 138
13.09 87.0% 15.89
7.8% 18.79
-18.6 18.6
231 641 872**
26.5% 73.5% 100.09
Value DF
Pearson Chi-Square 15. 22424 1
*p s 0.05
** Item non-responses coded as O,
Significance
.00010"
Count
Row Pct
Col Pot
Residual
The Importance of Federally Funded Aerospace R&D
Reported importance (1 = very unimportant: 5 = very
important) of federally funded R&D used to complete or
solve job-related projects, tasks, or problems wa_s correlated
with the level of technical uncertainty. Technical uncertainty
wa_ also correlated with the use of 1) colleagues outside of
the organization. 2) librarians/technical information special-
ists inside the organization, 3) computerized data bases, and
4) publications such a.s STAR to find out about the results of
federally funded aerospace ( l = never used: 4 = frequently
used). Pearson's r correlation coefficients follow:
Technical Uncertainty Rating and Sources Used
r
Importance of Federally-
Funded R&D .2354*
Use of:
Colleague Outside the Organization .2241'
Librarian/Technical Information
Specialist lnside the Organization .2089*
Computerized Data Base .2354*
STAR .1600"
* p _< 0.001.
Use of Colleagues Outside of the Organization
Technical Uncertainty K
Low Slgh
Don't Use .00
Use 1.00
Column
Total
179 364
33.0% 67.0%
77.5% 56.8%
35.2 -35.2
52 277
15.89 84.2%
22.5% 43.2%
-35.2 35.2
231 641
26.5% 73.5%
Value DF
Pearson Chi-Square 30. 98700 1
* ps 0.05
** Item non-responses coded as 0.
Row
Total
543
62.3%
329
37.7%
872**
100.09
Significance
.00000"
Use of Librarians/Technical Information Specialists
Inside the Organization
Don't Use
Count
Row Pct
Col Pot
Residual
Technical Uncertaintyl
Low Sigh
Use
Row
Total
.00 194 412 606
32.0% 68.0% 69.5%
84.0% 64.3%
33.5 -33.5
1.00 37 229 266
13.99 86.19 30.5%
16.09 35.7%
-33.5 33.5
Column 231 641 872**
Total 26.5% 73.59 100.09
Value DF Significance
.........................
Pearson Chi-Square 31.11160 I .00000"
*ps 0.05
** Item non-responses coded as 0.
Searches of Computerized Databases
Technical Uncertainty:
Low Sigh
Count
Row Pet
Col Pet
Residual
Don't Use .00
Use 1.00
Column
Total
Row
I Total
194 402 596
32.6% 67.4% 68.3%
84.0% 62.7%
36.1 -36.1
37 239 276
13.4% 86.6% 31.7%
16.0% 37.3%
-36.1 36.1
231 641 872**
26.5% 73.5% 100.0%
Value DF Significance
.........................
Pearson Chi-Square 35.50518 1 .00000"
*ps 0.05
** Item non-responses coded as 0.
Use of Publications Such as STAR
Count
Row Pct
Col Pct
Residual
Don't Use .00
Use 1.00
Column
Total
Technical Uncertaintym
Low Sigh
Row
Total
]96 460 656
29.9% 70.1% 75.2%
84.8% 71.8%
22.2 -22.2
35 181 216
16.2% 83.8% 24.8%
15.2% 28.2%
-22.2 22.2
231 641 872**
26.5% 73.5% 100.0%
Value DF Significance
.........................
Pearson Chl-Square 15.60333 1 .00008"
*ps 0.05
** Item non-responses coded as 0.
Technical Uncertainty and--
Not
Accepted Accepted
Information Production/Use
Information Written to Others X
Communicating Orally to Others X
Written Information from Others X
Oral Communication from Others X
External Information Use
Journal Articles X
Conference/Meeting Papers X
U.S. Government Technical Reports X
Colleagues Outside the Organization X
Use of Formal Information Sources
Librarian/Technical Information Specialist X
Technical Information Obtained from the
Organization's Library X
Use of Federally Funded Aerospace
R&D
Use of Federally Funded Aerospace
R&D X
Use of NASA or DoD Technical Reports X
Importance of Federally Funded Aerospace
R&D X
Colleagues Outside the Organization X
Librarian/Technical Information Specialist X
Computerized Data Base X
Publications Such as STAR X
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION OF THE
RESULTS
An exploratory study was conducted that investigated
the influence of technical uncertainty on the use of infor-
mation and information sources by U.S. industry-affiliated
aerospace engineers and scientists in completing or solving a
project, task, or problem. The results support the findings
of previous research. The results also support the following
study assumptions.
The chi-square test of independence revealed that an
association exists between the technical uncertainty of job-
related projects, tasks, and problems and (1) the use of fed-
erally funded aerospace R&D, (2) the use of federally funded
aerospace R&D found in NASA or DoD technical reports, (3)
the importance of federally funded aerospace R&D, (4) the
use of colleagues outside of the organization to find out about
the results of federally funded aerospace R&D, (5) the use
of librarians/technical information specialists inside the or-
ganization to find out about the results of federally funded
aerospace R&D, (6) the use of computerized data bases to
find out about federally funded aerospace R&D, and (7) the
use of publications such as STAR to find out about the results
of federally funded aerospace R&D. Therefore, hypotheses
Hi1 through H17 are supported.
Summary
Seventeen hypotheses concerned with technical uncer-
tainty and (1) information production/use, (2) external in-
formation use, (3) the use of formal information sources, and
(4) the use of federally funded aerospace R&D were tested.
The results of the tests follow:
1. Information use and information-source use patterns
differ for industry-affiliated U.S. aerospace engineers
and scientists working on projects, problems, and
tasks with high and low technical uncertainty.
2. As technical uncertainty increases, information-source
use changes from internal to external and from in-
formal to formal. Specifically, industry-affiliated
U.S. aerospace engineers and scientists working on
projects, problems, and tasks with high technical
uncertainty make greater use of external sources of
information such as (1) colleagues outside their or-
ganization, (2) published sources of written informa-
tion originating outside their organization (e.g., con-
ference/mecting papers, journal articles, and tech-
nical reports), and (3) formal information sources
including the organization's library or technical
information center and the organization's librar-
ian/technical information specialist.
3. The use of federally funded aerospace R&D is differ-
ent for industry-affiliated U.S. aerospace engineers
?
and scientists working on projects, problems, and
tasks with high and low technical uncertainty.
4. As technical uncertainty increases, so too does the
use of federally funded aerospace R&D, thereby sup-
porting the assumption that the results of federally
funded aerospace R&D are used by U.S. aerospace
engineers and scientists in industry to moderate (re-
duce) technical uncertainty.
5. The use of formal information sources to learn about
federally funded aerospace R&D differs for industry-
affiliated U.S. aerospace engineers and scientists
working on projects, problems, and tasks with high
and low technical uncertainty.
Given the limited purposes of this exploratory study and
the research design, the results help explain but cannot be
used to predict information use. A more rigorous research
design and methodology is needed before any such claims of
prediction could be made. Certain scales of measurement
used in this study would have to be changed and Flanagan's
critical incident technique followed more closely.
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